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SHOULD INVESTMENT TREATIES 
CONTAIN PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTIONS? 
CAROLINE HENCKELS* 
Abstract: The increasing inclusion of exceptions in newly concluded invest-
ment treaties, together with the divergent manner in which tribunals and an-
nulment committees have approached these provisions, suggests that a greater 
understanding of their role and purpose is needed. In particular, the question 
whether exceptions operate as permissions or as defenses is a crucial but un-
addressed issue that has significant implications for both litigation and prac-
tice and, in turn, implications for the stability of the regime. This Essay argues 
that as a starting point, exceptions should be understood as permissions that 
limit the scope of the substantive treaty obligations, and not as defenses in-
voked to justify prima facie unlawful conduct. Understanding exceptions as 
permissions has several advantages, including the avoidance of double-
counting a government’s motivation for its conduct or, more problematically, 
failing to take regulatory purpose into account when determining whether a 
government has complied with the treaty’s substantive obligations. Under-
standing exceptions as permissions also sends signals to adjudicators in rela-
tion to issues such as the appropriate standard of review. The Essay also ex-
plores the desirability of including exceptions in treaties in light of recent in-
novations that clarify the substantive content of investment obligations. Alt-
hough the uncertain analytic character of existing exceptions risks constrain-
ing rather than preserving regulatory space, they may be an important failsafe 
in light of current institutional arrangements for investor-state dispute settle-
ment, which effectively preclude review for error of law. The Essay concludes 
that the relationship between standards of investment protection and excep-
tions needs further consideration, and suggests that governments negotiating 
investment treaties ought to more holistically consider the aims of the regime 
and the role of exceptions therein. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Public policy exceptions in investment treaties permit a government to 
lawfully take action directed at a particular regulatory objective, industry, or 
sector of the economy that would otherwise be inconsistent with its substan-
tive treaty obligations. Exceptions have become an increasingly popular 
mechanism in investment treaties, appearing in 43% of investment agree-
ments concluded between 2011 and 2016, compared to 7% of agreements 
signed between 1959 (when the first investment treaty was signed) and 
2010.1 The significant rise in their prevalence suggests that governments 
negotiating new treaties are seeking greater assurance that public welfare 
measures will be shielded from liability. Yet, their proliferation in recent 
treaties creates uncertainties in terms of how they ought to be interpreted—
whether but for the exception, a government would be in breach of its sub-
stantive obligations, or whether their inclusion is for the avoidance of 
doubt.2 In particular, the question whether the exception operates as a per-
mission or a defense is a crucial, but unaddressed issue that has significant 
implications for both litigation and practice and, in turn, may have implica-
tions for the stability of the investment regime. 
This Essay assesses the role and desirability of including exceptions in 
investment treaties in light of this interpretive uncertainty. Part I discusses 
two different ways of characterizing the role of exceptions—as either per-
missions, which limit the scope of the substantive obligations, or as defens-
es invoked to justify conduct that would otherwise be prohibited.3 Through 
this lens, Part II analyzes the manner in which investment tribunals have 
interpreted exceptions in terms of their analytic character, the relationship 
between exceptions and the regime’s substantive obligations, and any inter-
pretive maxims that tribunals apply to construction of the exception.4 Part 
III focuses on the role of exceptions in light of recent innovations in treaty 
design that attempt to inject greater determinacy into the normative content 
of the substantive obligations, asking whether exceptions are still a neces-
                                                                                                                           
 1 U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2017: 
Investment and the Digital Economy, 122 tbl. III.4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2017 (June 7, 
2017) (including investment chapters in other economic agreements). This statistic only appears to 
cover Article XX GATT-like exceptions and not other types of exceptions; this Essay takes a 
broader approach to the concept, as discussed further below. 
 2 See Andrew Newcombe, The Use of General Exceptions in IIAs: Increasing Legitimacy or 
Uncertainty?, in IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS 267, 277 (Armand de 
Mestral & Céline Lévesque eds., 2012) (noting that it is “unclear” whether the inclusion of excep-
tions in international investment agreements is because the treaties are “too broad” or are there to 
demonstrate “an abundance of caution”). 
 3 See infra notes 7–20 and accompanying text. 
 4 See infra notes 21–56 and accompanying text. 
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sary or desirable element of investment treaties in light of these reforms.5 
Although exceptions create some challenging questions of construction, 
they may be an important means of circumscribing adventurous interpreta-
tions of investment tribunals—at least in the current institutional climate, 
which effectively precludes review of decisions attended by legal error. This 
Essay concludes that the relationship between standards of investment pro-
tection and exceptions needs further consideration and suggests that states 
negotiating investment treaties ought to more holistically consider the aims 
of the regime and the role of exceptions therein.6 
I. UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF EXCEPTIONS 
A. A Typology of Investment Treaty Exceptions 
This Essay defines an exception as a phenomenon arising from the in-
terrelationship of two norms: the first is a command, and the second permits 
deviation from that command in specific circumstances.7 For the purpose of 
this Essay, I differentiate exceptions from qualifications to rules that are 
located within the provision itself or in an interpretive annex, such as provi-
sions clarifying the law on indirect expropriations.8 I also do not include in 
this category open-textured or flexible norms that permit consideration of 
all relevant circumstances in determining whether the norm has been com-
plied with, such as fair and equitable treatment (FET). 
The following is a taxonomy of the types of provisions that this Essay 
will examine: 
• General and security exceptions typically use language such as “noth-
ing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
of . . . ,” then impose some restrictions on the design of the measure by 
specifying a required nexus between the measure and the permissible 
objective or objectives, such as “necessary to”9 or “designed and ap-
                                                                                                                           
 5 See infra notes 57–74 and accompanying text. 
 6 See infra note 7–74 and accompanying text. 
 7 See Hans Kelsen, GENERAL THEORY OF NORMS 96 (Michael Hartney trans., 1991) (1976) 
(noting that “command” includes a negative-command (prohibition)). 
 8 See Claire Oakes Finkelstein, When the Rule Swallows the Exception, in RULES AND REA-
SONING: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FRED SCHAUER 147, 150 (Linda Meyer ed., 1999) (explaining that 
“[a]n exception is a qualification of a rule that stands in a certain relation to it, namely it stands 
outside the rule it qualifies. Thus, a qualification included in a statement of the rule is not properly 
speaking an exception to it”). 
 9 E.g. Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-Qatar, art. 10, June 11, 2016 
[hereinafter Argentina-Qatar BIT]; Ass’n of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN] Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, art. 17(1)(a), Feb. 26, 2009, http://agreement.asean.org/media/download/
20140119035519.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZT5-7ADP]. 
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plied to.”10 Increasingly, investment agreements contain exceptions 
that incorporate by reference or are modelled on the general exceptions 
in Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and Article XIV of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), which both contain an additional requirement that measures 
not be applied in an arbitrary or discriminatory way (the chapeau). 
• Carve-outs exempt an entire policy area or sector from the scope of a 
treaty. For example, Article 1108(7) of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) provides, inter alia, that the national treatment 
and most-favored nation treatment obligations in the investment chap-
ter “do not apply to . . . procurement by a Party or a state enterprise 
. . . ,” and Article 22 of the investment chapter of the Australia-
Singapore FTA provides that “[n]o claim may be brought . . . in respect 
of a tobacco control measure of a Party.”  
• Reservations are similar to carve-outs, but permit parties to unilaterally 
nominate a sector or sectors in relation to which they reserve the right 
to adopt or maintain otherwise non-conforming measures—whether in 
relation to some obligations or the agreement as a whole. For example, 
Articles 8.2(3) and 9.2(2)(b) and (c) of the Comprehensive Economic 
and Trade Agreement between Canada and the European Union (CE-
TA) provide that for the E.U., obligations regarding establishment and 
non-discriminatory treatment of investments “do not apply to a meas-
ure with respect to audio-visual services” and for Canada “do not ap-
ply to a measure affecting . . . cultural industries . . . .”11 
One might argue that general and security exceptions perform a different 
function to carve-outs and reservations. Carve-outs and reservations seek to 
quarantine specific sectors or industries (e.g. cultural industries) or policy 
areas (e.g. taxation) from the scope of the agreement ex ante, whereas excep-
tions preserve broad policy space across all sectors for future exigencies. Ex-
ceptions, traditionally understood, are typically more open–textured in terms 
of permissible objectives (“morals,” “security,” and so on). At the same time, 
as noted above, they generally impose greater discipline on the design of 
measures in order to guard against possible abuse, such as by requiring that 
                                                                                                                           
 10 E.g. Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area, art. 22(1), May 23, 
2007, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/3092 [https://perma.cc/3RF2-
T6PV] [hereinafter COMESA]. 
 11 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, Can.-European Union, art. 8.2(3), 
9.2(2)(c), Oct. 30, 2016, 2017 O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]. 
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measures be “necessary,” and/or by prohibiting application of the measure in 
such a way as to subvert the discipline of the substantive obligations.12 
Still, there is good reason to take a broad approach to the concept of ex-
ceptions. The distinction between the different types of provisions is not al-
ways clear. Clauses that are denoted as exceptions sometimes require only that 
measures be (for example) “related to” or “for” a particular objective, which 
hardly imposes more discipline on the measure than the language of typical 
carve-outs and reservations. Some of the permissible objectives found in ex-
ceptions refer to specific products or issues (for example, Article XX GATT 
includes exceptions “relating to the importations or exportations of gold or 
silver” and “relating to the products of prison labour”).13 As I will argue be-
low, subject always to the language of the particular provision being interpret-
ed, exceptions, carve-outs and reservations can be understood as playing the 
same role: that is, giving permission to states to act in relation to the matters 
stipulated in the provision without violating the rules of the regime. 
B. The Analytic Character of Exceptions 
Exceptions signal to adjudicators, governments, and potential claim-
ants that the purpose of the treaty is not solely to protect investment at the 
expense of other public policy objectives.14 Yet, a key area of uncertainty 
concerns the analytic character of these provisions: that is, the question 
whether an exception operates as a permission or as a defense. The distinc-
tion is not merely theoretical; it has significant normative and practical con-
sequences.15 
One way of describing the role of an exception is that where a gov-
ernment establishes that it is taking action that is comes within the scope of 
the provision, the treaty obligations do not apply. A treaty exception might 
                                                                                                                           
 12 I am grateful to Jürgen Kurtz for raising this issue and to Andrew Newcombe for helpful 
discussions. 
 13 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX(c), (e), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 14 See JÜRGEN KURTZ, THE WTO AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: CONVERGING 
SYSTEMS 169 (2015) (noting that by including exceptions in investment treaties, “negotiators . . . 
are thus clearly signaling that investment liberalization and protection are not the exclusive goals 
of the network”); U.N. Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Re-
port 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WIR/2015, 140 
(June 25, 2015) [hereinafter World Investment Report 2015] (noting that public policy exceptions 
“can also have an important signaling effect towards the general public, indicating an agreement’s 
compatibility with sustainable development and public policy considerations”). 
 15 I explore some of these issues further in Caroline Henckels, Scope Limitation or Affirma-
tive Defence? The Purpose and Role of Investment Treaty Exception Clauses, in EXCEPTIONS AND 
DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Lorand Bartels & Federica Paddeu eds., forthcoming 2019) 
[hereinafter EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW]. 
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therefore be characterized as a limitation on the scope of the investment 
protections in the treaty, or as a permission to engage in conduct covered by 
the clause.16 Alternatively, an exception could be regarded as an affirmative 
defense. A state relying on the exception would not deny that it had failed to 
observe its treaty obligations, but would seek to avoid the consequences of 
its actions on the basis that it was acting to protect interests permitted by the 
clause. In other words, action coming within the scope of the exception 
would justify (that is, render lawful)17 conduct that would otherwise be pro-
hibited by the treaty.18 
Normatively, there is a difference between characterizing government 
action to promote public welfare as outside the scope of the obligations, 
compared with characterizing such action as generally prohibited but justi-
fied in exceptional circumstances. If the exception is a permission that lim-
its the scope of the investment protections in the treaty, a state’s compliance 
with international law is presumed, but this is not the case where a state 
must rely on an affirmative defense to justify otherwise unlawful conduct.19 
Moreover, to characterize an exception as an affirmative defense is to view 
the international investment regime through a lens of prohibition: govern-
ment action negatively impacting foreign investment is generally prohibit-
ed, unless a tribunal grants specific authorization after the fact, in excep-
tional circumstances.20 Even though a finding that a state has engaged in 
prohibited conduct is only made as a preliminary, defeasible stage in the 
reasoning process, it is, nevertheless, symbolically significant from the 
point of view of the host state. A government might consider it more palata-
ble to domestic constituencies for action taken to promote public welfare to 
be exempt from the treaty obligations, rather than to be prima facie in 
breach of those obligations.  
                                                                                                                           
 16 Jaap Hage, Antonia Waltermann & Gustavo Arosemena, Logical Tools for International 
Law, in EXCEPTIONS AND DEFENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 15. 
 17 A justification permits a party to engage in conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by 
the regime, meaning that the conduct is lawful. See generally Kent Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justifications from Excuses, 49 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (1986) (providing further discussion 
regarding how to distinguish between an excuse and a justification). 
 18 See KURTZ, supra note 14, at 217–18 (explaining how the exception operates to “save” a 
prima facie breach of a state’s obligations). 
 19 See generally CAROLINE E. FOSTER, SCIENCE AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: EXPERT EVIDENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF AND FINALI-
TY 213 (2011) (discussing how the invocation of an exception removes the presumption of com-
pliance with international law). 
 20 See Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872–73 (1991) (describing the 
relationship between rules and their exceptions); Foster, supra note 19, at 214 (noting how in 
exceptions, the party claiming the exception bears the burden of proof). 
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II. THE TREATMENT OF EXCEPTIONS IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 
Any analysis of the decided investment cases is hindered by the fact 
that in no case has an investment tribunal or annulment committee ex-
plained how it arrived at its characterization of an exception—whether as a 
matter of treaty interpretation, or based on normative considerations. More-
over, the parties’ submissions are not always available, or are not directed to 
this issue. However, a careful parsing of the decisions permits their catego-
rization into defenses and permissions. 
A. The Character of the Exception 
1. Exception as Defense 
Early tribunals determining claims involving the security exception in 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT21—CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine 
Republic in 2004,22 Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine 
Republic in 2007,23 and Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic 
in 200724—appeared to view the provision as an affirmative defense, alt-
hough their characterization of the exception is difficult to untangle from 
their mistaken understanding of the relationship between the exception and 
the defense of necessity at customary international law. Two further tribu-
nals hearing claims against Argentina—El Paso Energy International Com-
pany v. Argentine Republic in 2011 and LG&E Energy Corporation v. Ar-
gentine Republic in 2006—adopted a similar approach, based on an appar-
ent misapprehension that the exception was a lex specialis expression of the 
necessity defense.25 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment, U.S.-Arg., 
art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. 103-2 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Argentina BIT] (“This 
Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary for . . . the 
[p]rotection of its own essential security interests.”). 
 22 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Award, 
¶¶ 320–324, 329, 355–356, 374 (May 12, 2004). 
 23 Enron Corp. & Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, 
Award, ¶¶ 334, 339 (May 22, 2007) [hereinafter Enron Award]. 
 24 Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentina Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶¶ 376, 
388 (Sept. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Sempra Award]. 
 25 El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 552 
(Oct. 31, 2011); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision 
on Liability, ¶¶ 229, 257, 261 (Oct. 3, 2006) [hereinafter LG&E Award]. See generally Henckels, 
supra note 15 (providing further discussion on the analytic character of exceptions); Caroline 
Henckels, Investment Treaty Security Exceptions, Necessity & Self-Defence in the Context of 
Armed Conflict, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. (forthcoming 2018) (for further discussion on the rela-
tionship between security exceptions and the circumstances precluding wrongfulness). Lex spe-
cialis is an interpretive maxim in international law which provides that whenever two or more 
 
2832 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:2825 
In 2017, the Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Republic of Peru tri-
bunal appeared to view a general exceptions provision, akin to Article XX 
GATT, as operating to justify otherwise unlawful conduct, referring to the 
exception being invoked to “justify” government conduct.26 The tribunal in 
Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States in 2006 took 
the same approach in relation to an exception for prudential measures 
(“Nothing in this Part . . . shall be construed to prevent a Party from adopt-
ing or maintaining reasonable measures for prudential reasons.”).27 
2. Exception as Permission 
Other tribunals and annulment committees have viewed the same or 
similar provisions as permissions that limit the scope of investment protec-
tions in the treaty. 
The CMS v. Argentina annulment committee held in 2007 that where 
the U.S.-Argentina BIT security exception applied, the “substantive obliga-
tions under the Treaty do not apply,”28 and in 2008, the Continental Casual-
ty Company v. Argentine Republic tribunal held that this provision “re-
served rights” of state parties under the treaty: where it applied, the substan-
tive obligations would be “set[] aside or suspend[ed]” and measures coming 
within the exception would “lie outside the scope of the Treaty.”29 
Likewise, in 2016, the Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic 
of Ecuador tribunal, deciding a claim involving a general exception clause 
substantially similar to Article XX GATT, held that an expropriation would 
be proven, in part, by the “non-application” of the exception.30 This inter-
pretation suggests that that the tribunal viewed the provision as limiting the 
scope of the treaty, in the sense that the claimant would have to prove that 
the impugned measure did not come within the scope of the treaty protec-
tions. 
                                                                                                                           
norms deal with the same subject matter, priority should be afforded to the more specific norm. 
See Dorota Marianna Banaszewska, Lex specialis, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2008). 
 26 Bear Creek Mining Corp. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/21, Award, ¶ 475 
(Nov. 30, 2017) [hereinafter Bear Creek Award]. 
 27 Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)02/01, 
Award, ¶¶ 158, 168 (July 17, 2006); see North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 
art. 1410, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]; KURTZ, supra note 14, at 188–89. 
 28 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08, Decision 
on Annulment, ¶ 129 (Sept. 25, 2007). 
 29 Continental Casualty Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 
¶¶ 164, 168 (Sept. 5, 2008). 
 30 Copper Mesa Mining Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, PCA No. 2012-2, Award, ¶ 6.58 (Mar. 
15, 2016). 
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Tribunals in some sixteen decisions to date31 have interpreted carve–
outs and reservations (for taxation, cultural industries, government pro-
curement, and performance requirements) as permissions that exclude cer-
tain measures from the scope of the treaty obligations. The provisions in 
question variously state: 
• “[T]he provisions of this Treaty . . . shall apply to matters of taxation 
only with respect to . . .”;32 
• “Except as otherwise provided in this Article, nothing in this Treaty 
shall create rights or impose obligations with respect to Taxation 
Measures of the Contracting Parties . . . ”;33 
• “Except as set out in this Article, nothing in this Agreement shall apply 
to taxation measures”;34 
• “[A]ll matters relating to taxation . . . shall be excluded from this Trea-
ty”;35 
• “The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to taxation”;36 
                                                                                                                           
 31 As of September 11, 2018 (as far as the author is aware). 
 32 The Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, U.S.-Ecuador, art. X(2), 
Aug. 27, 1993, S. TREATY DOC. 103-15 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Ecuador BIT]; U.S.-Argentina 
BIT, supra note 21, art. XII(2); see Treaty Concerning the Treatment and Protection of Invest-
ments, U.S.-Pan., art. XI(2), Oct. 27, 1982, S. TREATY DOC. 99-14 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 1227; Pan 
American Energy LLC v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, Decision on Prelimi-
nary Objections, ¶¶ 135, 139 (July 27, 2006); El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID ARB/03/15, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 115–116 (Apr. 27, 2006). But see El Paso Energy, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶¶ 448–449 (hinting that the tribunal may have viewed the 
provision, like the security exception, as a defense). 
 33 Energy Charter Treaty art. 21(1), Dec. 17, 1998, 2080 U.N.T.S. 95, 34 I.L.M 360 [hereinaf-
ter ECT]; see Antaris Solar GmbH v. Czech Republic, PCA Case No. 2014-01, Award, ¶¶ 215–
217 (May 2, 2018); Eiser Infrastructure Ltd. & Energia Solar Luxembourg S.á.r.l. v. Kingdom of 
Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/36, Award, ¶ 270 (May 4, 2017); Hulley Enters. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. 
Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 226, Final Award, ¶¶ 1405, 1430, 1433 (July 18, 2014); 
Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 227, Final Award, 
¶¶ 1405, 1430, 1433 (July 18, 2014); Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, 
PCA Case No. AA 228, Final Award, ¶¶ 1405, 1430, 1433 (July 18, 2014); Plama Consortium 
Ltd. v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Award, ¶ 266 (Aug. 27, 2008).  
 34 Agreement for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Can.-Ecuador, art. 
XII(1), Apr. 29, 1996, 2027 U.N.T.S. 196 [hereinafter Canada–Ecuador BIT 1996], http://
investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/609 [https://perma.cc/7WZN-55N2]; NAFTA, 
supra note 27, art. 2103; see Resolute Forest Prod. Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2016-13, 
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, ¶ 328 (Jan. 30, 2018); Cargill, Inc. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, Award, ¶ 297 (Sept. 18, 2009); Marvin Feldman v. Mexico 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 141 (Dec. 16, 2002); EnCana Corp. v. Republic of Ecua-
dor, LCIA UN3481, Award, ¶¶ 140–148 (Feb. 3, 2006) (London Ct. of Int’l Arb.). 
 35 Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investments, Egypt-
U.S., art. XI, Mar. 11, 1986, S. TREATY DOC. 99-24 (1986); see Ampal-American Israel Corp. v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/11, Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 267 (Feb. 1, 
2016). 
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• Certain obligations “do not apply to . . . procurement by a Party or a 
state enterprise . . . ”;37 
• The prohibition on performance requirements “do[es] not apply to . . . 
any existing non-conforming measure”;38 and 
• “[A]ny measure adopted or maintained with respect to cultural indus-
tries . . . shall be governed under this Agreement exclusively in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement.”39 
As is evident from the wording of these provisions, by their typical stip-
ulation that the treaty obligations do “not apply” in certain contexts, their in-
tended effect is far more precise than Article XX GATT-type exceptions, by 
more clearly directing tribunals to construe these provisions as permissions. 
B. The Relationship Between the Exception and the  
Substantive Treaty Obligations 
In recent years, many tribunals have considered the purpose, subject-
matter, design and application of a challenged measure in the context of 
determining the state’s compliance with the substantive obligations in the 
treaty. These are also considerations that are usually relevant in determining 
whether an exception would apply.40 Because these factors are germane to 
both the threshold question of compliance with the substantive obligations 
in the treaty and to the question whether an exception is applicable, it is ar-
guable that the presence of an exception can give rise to certain interpretive 
                                                                                                                           
 36 Agreement on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Den.-Russ., art. 
11(3), Dec. 11, 1993, http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/1028 [https://
perma.cc/BYQ9-R2K7]; see RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation, SCC Case No. V079/
2005, Final Award, ¶¶ 618, 628 (Sept. 12, 2010). 
 37 NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 1108(7)(a); see Mesa Power Grp., LLC v. Gov’t of Canada, 
UNCITRAL, PCA Case No. 2012-17, Award, ¶ 427 (Mar. 24, 2016); United Parcel Serv. of Am. 
Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, UNCITRAL, ICSID Case No. UNCT/02/1, Award on the Merits, ¶ 127 
(May 24, 2007) [hereinafter UPS Award]. But see UPS Award, supra, at Separate Statement of 
Arbitrator Cass, ¶ 133 (referring to the provision as an “affirmative defense[]”); ADF Grp. v. 
United States of America, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/1, Award, ¶ 170 (Jan. 9, 2003). 
 38 NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 1108(1)(a); see Mobil Invs. Canada & Murphy Oil Corp. v. 
Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and on Principles of Quantum, 
¶¶ 247, 266 (May 22, 2012). 
 39 NAFTA, supra note 27, Annex 2106; see id., art. 2106. Article 2005 of the Canada-United 
States Free Trade Agreement (1987) provides: “Cultural industries are exempt from the provisions 
of this Agreement . . . .” See Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S., art. 2005, Dec. 22, 1987, 27 
I.L.M. 281; UPS Award, supra note 37, ¶¶ 161–162, 167; UPS Award, supra note 37, at Separate 
Statement of Arbitrator Cass, ¶ 141. 
 40 See, e.g., Bilcon of Del., Inc. v. Gov’t of Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Juris-
diction and Liability, ¶ 723 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2015) [hereinafter Bilcon Award]. 
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dilemmas that may, paradoxically, reduce states’ regulatory space under in-
vestment treaties, depending on the character of the exception. 
If an exception is treated as an affirmative defense, the principle of ef-
fectiveness in treaty interpretation would suggest that the challenged meas-
ure’s objective should be considered only in the context of determining 
whether the exception applies, rather than in determining compliance with 
the substantive obligations—otherwise, the effect of the exception would be 
diminished or redundant.41 Arbitrators appear to have taken this approach in 
the LG&E v. Argentina and in Bear Creek v. Peru cases. In LG&E v. Argen-
tina, the tribunal found Argentina in breach of fair and equitable treatment, 
but ultimately not liable due to successful invocation of the security excep-
tion.42 Although the analytical process undertaken by the tribunal is less 
than clear, the presence of the exception seemingly directed it to analyze the 
circumstances surrounding Argentina’s actions (the emergency situation 
imperiling Argentine society) only as a question of justification, rather than 
in the context of determining compliance with fair and equitable treatment. 
In Bear Creek v. Peru, the tribunal suggested that the general exceptions 
provision (discussed above) and an annex clarifying states’ police powers in 
the context of indirect expropriation43 would both operate to justify other-
wise unlawful conduct.44 The tribunal, however, then went on to find that 
the presence of the general exception clause meant that “no other excep-
tions [e.g., police powers] from general international law or otherwise can 
be considered applicable in this case.”45 That is to say, the tribunal held that 
the factors that would otherwise have been taken into account in the deter-
mination of whether a measure was an indirect expropriation or an exercise 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See Bradly J. Condon, Treaty Structure and Public Interest Regulation in International 
Economic Law, 17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 333, 342–43 (2014) (noting that “the presence of general 
exceptions that explicitly address public interest regulation makes it inappropriate to address pub-
lic interest regulation in general scope provisions or specific limitations on the scope of specific 
obligations” because doing so would “diminish” exceptions’ impact and render them “redun-
dant”); Céline Lévesque, The Inclusion of GATT XX Exceptions in IIAs: A Potentially Risky Poli-
cy, in PROSPECTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW & POLICY: WORLD TRADE FORUM 363, 
366–67 (Roberto Echandi & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2013) (noting that the presence of an exception 
would narrow tribunals’ approaches to the substantive obligations, as a broader approach like that 
currently taken by NAFTA tribunals in relation to national treatment run contrary to the principle 
of effectiveness). 
 42 LG&E Award, supra note 25, ¶¶ 132–139. 
 43 Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Annex 812.1(c), 
May 29, 2008, http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/
agr-acc/peru-perou/fta-ale/08.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/Q949-YVLZ]. 
 44 See Bear Creek Award, supra note 26, ¶ 473. 
 45 Id. 
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of police powers were only relevant insofar as they were embodied in the 
exception clause. 
These cases highlight the problems that can arise from the inclusion of 
an exception clause in a treaty where the substantive investment protection 
obligations already permit an assessment of the circumstances of the meas-
ure’s adoption and/or implementation. The LG&E v. Argentina decision can, 
in this respect, be contrasted with the Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic deci-
sion in 2010.46 In Total, the tribunal found that the same measures did not 
breach fair and equitable treatment in the context of the France-Argentina 
BIT, which does not contain an exception.47 Relatedly, the presence of excep-
tions in some treaties but not others may send a signal to tribunals that treaties 
without exceptions do not permit tribunals to examine whether a challenged 
measure is directed to promoting public welfare at all when determining 
whether a state has complied with its investment treaty obligations. Although 
this might sound a little far-fetched, the tribunal in BG Group Plc. v. Republic 
of Argentina in 2007 effectively refused to consider whether Argentina’s 
emergency measures had a legitimate public welfare objective, on the basis 
that the U.K.-Argentina BIT contained no security exception.48 
C. Application of Exception May Restrict Regulatory Flexibility 
When exceptions are interpreted as defenses, their effect may be to re-
strict, rather than enhance, states’ regulatory flexibility.49 Exceptions typi-
cally contain an exhaustive list of permissible objectives that, depending on 
how the provision is drafted, risks failing to keep pace with developments 
in governments’ regulatory priorities. It has been argued that the general 
exceptions in the WTO agreements, for example, might not authorize the 
adoption of certain measures adopted to protect human rights or to deal with 
climate change.50 In Bear Creek, the tribunal held that only the enumerated 
                                                                                                                           
46 Compare LG&E Award, supra note 25, ¶¶ 132–139, with Total S.A. v. Argentine Repub-
lic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1, Decision on Liability ¶¶ 163–165, 309, 429 (Dec. 27, 2010) [here-
inafter Total Award]. 
 47 Total Award, supra note 46, ¶¶ 163–165, 309, 429. 
 48 BG Group Plc. v. Republic of Argentina, UNCITRAL, Final Award, ¶¶ 373, 385–387 
(Dec. 24, 2007).  
 49 See Lévesque, supra note 41, at 364 (arguing that the inclusion of exceptions in investment 
treaties creates the “risk that such provisions could reduce rather than improve” the regime’s bal-
ance “between investment protection and other public policy objectives”); Newcombe, supra note 
2, at 278–81 (noting that the inclusion of exceptions in investment treaties “might have the unin-
tended consequence of limiting the range of legitimate objectives available to the state”). 
 50 Although a “public morals” exception may be sufficiently open-textured as to accommo-
date measures that do not come within one of the other exceptions: as a WTO panel remarked, the 
content of the concepts “public morals” and “public order” “can vary in time and space, depending 
upon a range of factors including prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.” Panel 
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policy areas in the general exceptions clause would be relevant to defeat a 
prima facie claim of indirect expropriation.51 In doing so, the tribunal 
viewed the exception as subsuming the police powers doctrine, which does 
not limit permissible objectives (whether as a rule of customary law or as 
clarified in recent treaties). Likewise, when determining compliance with 
other substantive investment norms such as fair and equitable treatment and 
national treatment, tribunals can, in theory, consider an unlimited list of le-
gitimate regulatory objectives. 
For that matter, exceptions may well have a more stringent nexus re-
quirement than investment tribunals have applied in the context of relevant 
substantive norm. For example, exceptions that require that government 
action be “necessary” to achieve the particular objective arguably demand a 
form of least restrictive means analysis that is akin to the WTO Appellate 
Body’s approach to the general exceptions in GATT and GATS (as the Con-
tinental Casualty v. Argentina tribunal held, extensively relying on WTO 
jurisprudence when determining the applicability of the security exception 
in the U.S.-Argentina BIT).52 By comparison, many investment tribunals 
have used a less rigorous test in determining whether fair and equitable 
treatment and national treatment have been complied with. These other de-
cisions often require only a rational or reasonable connection between a 
non–discriminatory public welfare objective and the challenged measure.53 
Quarantining consideration of the nature of the challenged measure to the 
context of the exception (à la LG&E v. Argentina, for example) risks apply-
ing a more stringent legal test than would otherwise apply. 
D. Narrow Interpretation of Exception and Strict Standard of Review 
Another potential issue that arises when viewing an exception as a de-
fense is the prospect that a tribunal might adopt a narrow construction of the 
exception based on the view that exceptions are derogations from the gen-
eral rule(s) that ought to be given a restrictive interpretation. We see this 
                                                                                                                           
Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, ¶ 6.461, WT/DS285/R (adopted Nov. 10, 2004). 
 51 See Bear Creek Award, supra note 26, ¶ 473; id. at Partial Dissenting Opinion of Professor 
Phillippe Sands QC, ¶ 41. 
 52 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, ¶¶ 181, 223 
(Sept. 5, 2008). See generally, Andrew D. Mitchell & Caroline Henckels, Variations on a Theme: 
Comparing the Concept of “Necessity” in International Investment Law and WTO Law, 14 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 93, 127 (2013) (examining investment tribunals and the WTO Appellate Body’s ap-
proaches to determining whether a measure is “necessary”). 
 53 See CAROLINE HENCKELS, PROPORTIONALITY & DEFERENCE IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBI-
TRATION: BALANCING INVESTMENT PROTECTION & REGULATORY AUTONOMY 115–22 (2015) 
(discussing various methods of review that tribunals have employed). 
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occurring in Enron Corporation Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentina Repub-
lic and in Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, where both 
tribunals stated that “the object and purpose of the Treaty is . . . [to apply] in 
situations of economic difficulty and hardship that require the protection of 
the internationally guaranteed rights of its beneficiaries . . . any interpreta-
tion, resulting in an escape route from the defined obligations cannot be 
easily reconciled with that object and purpose. Accordingly, a restrictive 
interpretation of any such alternative is mandatory.”54 In 2006, in Canfor 
Corporation v. United States, the tribunal reviewed a number of exceptions 
in NAFTA (including reservations for existing non-conforming measures, a 
carve-out for government procurement, and exclusions from dispute settle-
ment), holding that, as a general interpretive maxim, exceptions should “be 
interpreted narrowly.”55 
Viewing an exception as an affirmative defense might, alternatively, 
result in a tribunal affording less restraint in its scrutiny of a host state’s ar-
guments defending its actions than it otherwise would. In other words, a 
tribunal might be tempted to employ a stricter standard of review than it 
would have applied in the context of determining compliance with a sub-
stantive obligation or viewing the exception as a permission. In 2007, in 
UPS v. Canada, for example, one of the arbitrators opined that in determin-
ing whether Canada had breached the national treatment obligation, “a more 
deferential—though certainly not a wholly deferential—review [is] in or-
der” than determining whether an exception was made out; in this context, 
“I do not believe a similar deference is appropriate.”56 
III. GREATER PRECISION IN TREATY DRAFTING:  
IMPLICATIONS FOR EXCEPTIONS 
A. Specific Obligations Versus Exceptions 
Whether an exception to a rule is needed depends in part on the lin-
guistic tools that are available to the rule-drafter.57 A precisely drafted norm 
that is clear about the conduct that is and is not permitted might remove the 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Sempra Award, supra note 24, ¶ 373; Enron Award, supra note 23, ¶ 331. Nevertheless, as 
noted above, these tribunals conflated the exception with the defense of necessity at customary 
international law. Viewing these norms as separate might have led to a less narrow interpretation 
of the exception clause. 
 55 Canfor Corp. v. United States, Terminal Forest Prods. Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL, 
Decision on Preliminary Question, ¶ 187 n.198 (June 6, 2006). 
 56 UPS Award, supra note 37, at Separate Statement of Arbitrator Cass, ¶ 149; see Noble 
Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No ARB/01/11, Award, ¶ 55 (Oct. 12, 2005). 
 57 See Schauer, supra note 20, at 874–75 (describing the language limitations a rule-drafter 
faces). 
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need to have recourse to an exception. As such, it is arguable that the intro-
duction of exceptions into new investment treaties creates uncertainty, and 
that a preferable approach would be for treaty parties to clarify the substan-
tive obligations so as to better reflect a balance between regulatory freedom 
and investment protection.58 This approach—embedding consideration of 
the purpose and tailoring of the challenged measure within the substantive 
obligation—is also preferable based on the normative considerations re-
ferred to above. The challenge is to draft a provision that is sufficiently pre-
cise, but not so rigid as to be unable to adapt to all possible contingencies. 
In this regard, developments in treaty drafting that attempt to inject 
greater determinacy into the substantive obligations have taken place pri-
marily in relation to fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation. 
In relation to fair and equitable treatment, following several early decisions 
that took extremely broad approaches to interpreting the obligation, in 2001 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) parties adopted a 
binding interpretation of the fair and equitable treatment clause stating that 
it “prescribes” and does not require “treatment in addition to or beyond” the 
customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.59 
This clarification has had some impact on NAFTA tribunals, which have 
generally accepted that the threshold for breach is a high one.60 However, 
there is a lack of consensus concerning what the customary minimum 
standard of treatment actually requires of states in the regulatory context.61 
As such, this clarification may not provide sufficient certainty as to the con-
duct that is permitted and proscribed. 
The fair and equitable treatment (FET) clause in the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) attempts 
to address this issue, providing some limited references to the normative 
content of the obligation in relation to denials of justice, investors’ expecta-
tions, and subsidies and grants.62 Otherwise, the clause refers to the custom-
                                                                                                                           
 58 See Newcombe, supra note 2, at 269 (arguing that “the better way forward is . . . through 
states clarifying the scope of investment obligations in their investment treaty practice”). 
 59 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions 
(July 31, 2001). Article 1133(2) NAFTA provides that notes of interpretation issued by the 
NAFTA Free Trade Commission (comprising ministerial representatives of each party) are bind-
ing on arbitral tribunals. See NAFTA, supra note 27, art. 1132(2). 
 60 Although certain cases, such as the recent Bilcon v. Canada decision, demonstrate that 
tribunals are not immune from taking an expansive approach to when a state will be in breach of 
the customary international law minimum standard. See Bilcon Award, supra note 40, ¶¶ 441–454. 
 61 See, e.g., ROLAND KLÄGER, ‘FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT’ IN INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT LAW 48–61, 71–72, 75–76, 87–88 (2011) (discussing various understandings of the 
minimum standard treatment). 
 62 See Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement, arts. 9.6 (2)(a), (4), (5), Feb. 4, 2016 (no longer 
in effect), https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-
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ary international law minimum standard of treatment without further con-
cretization. Another approach is taken in Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA), where the fair and equitable treatment clause 
states that a government breaches fair and equitable treatment only where it 
engages in certain specified conduct.63 Some of the elements of the defini-
tion of FET permit consideration of both public and private interests and 
any legitimate public policy basis for the measure in the determination of 
breach (“fundamental breach of due process,” and, perhaps, “manifest arbi-
trariness”).64 Other elements would seemingly not permit an exception to res-
cue the conduct, namely “targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful 
grounds” and “abusive treatment.” What is clear is the parties’ intent that bo-
na fide regulatory or administrative measures, adopted in order to promote 
public welfare, would not be captured within this definition. Arguably, this 
could have been spelled out more explicitly.65 
This attempt to more precisely define proscribed government action is 
relevant to the scope of the CETA’s general exceptions provision,66 which 
does not apply to fair and equitable treatment or to expropriation,67 suggest-
ing that the parties’ preference was to clarify the substantive obligations ra-
ther than relying on exceptions to maintain regulatory flexibility. This ap-
proach is somewhat undermined by the fact that the exception clause applies 
to CETA’s investment chapter in relation to national treatment and most–
favored nation treatment. Investment tribunals have almost invariably consid-
ered a government’s reasons for its actions in the context of determining 
whether a measure complies with national treatment, in circumstances where 
the treaty provision is silent as to the role of the regulatory purpose in the dis-
crimination inquiry.68 Providing an exception for the non–discrimination sug-
                                                                                                                           
full-text [https://perma.cc/3884-68WK] [hereinafter TPP]. Article 1 of the Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership incorporates the TPP by reference. 
 63 CETA, supra note 11, art. 8.10(2). 
 64 See id., art. 8.10(2)(b)–(c) (providing that a breach of fair and equitable treatment includes 
a “fundamental breach of due process,” and “manifest arbitrariness”). 
 65 See generally Caroline Henckels, Protecting Regulatory Autonomy Through Greater Preci-
sion in Investment Treaties: The TPP, CETA, and TTIP, 19 J. INT’L ECON. L. 27 (2016) (arguing 
for more precise terminology in treaties to limit arbitral discretion). 
 66 See CETA, supra note 11, art. 28.3 (outlining the general exceptions to CETA). 
 67 See id., Annex 8-A (defining expropriation). CETA clarifies that “except in rare circumstances 
. . . non-discriminatory measures of a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public 
welfare objectives, such as health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropria-
tions.” Id.; see also TPP, supra note 62, Annex 9-B (stating that “[n]on-discriminatory regulatory 
actions by a Party that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations . . . ”). 
 68 See generally Andrew D. Mitchell, David Heaton & Caroline Henckels, NON-
DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROLE OF REGULATORY PURPOSE IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
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gests that the intention may be to jettison the body of decided cases in favor 
of justifying differential treatment under the exception provision. The parties 
could have provided more clarity in the national treatment clause itself as 
they have done for fair and equitable treatment and indirect expropriation. 
The drafters of the CPTPP, for instance, provided in an explanatory note that 
the question whether treatment has been accorded in like circumstances “de-
pends on the totality of the circumstances, including whether the relevant 
treatment distinguishes between investors or investments on the basis of legit-
imate public welfare objectives” and noted that to avoid liability, any differ-
ential treatment must be plausibly or reasonably “connected to [a] legitimate 
public welfare objective[]” and be applied in a non-discriminatory manner.69 
Again, these criteria appear to incorporate considerations relevant to an ex-
ception into the substantive obligation itself. 
B. Do Precisely Defined Obligations Obviate the Need for Exceptions? 
While it is difficult to see how a measure that failed to comply with 
CETA’s fair and equitable treatment provision (for example) could be saved 
by an exception, it is arguable that exceptions still have a role to play even 
where the substantive obligations are drafted with greater precision. Under 
current institutional arrangements for investor-state dispute settlement, 
which effectively preclude review of tribunal decisions attended by legal 
error, it would be overly optimistic to rely on arbitrators to “get it right” in 
every case. My analysis of WTO decisions dealing with Article XX GATT 
or Article XIV GATS demonstrate that forty-seven percent of panel findings 
concerning these provisions were fully or partially reversed on appeal.70 
This suggests that institutional reform could have a significant role to play 
in correcting erroneous interpretations of exceptions. 
                                                                                                                           
INVESTMENT LAW (2016) (analyzing the decided WTO and investment cases in terms of the role 
of regulatory purpose in the discrimination inquiry). 
 69 TPP Drafters, Drafters’ Note on Interpretation of “In Like Circumstances” Under Article 
9.4 (National Treatment) and Article 9.5 (Most–Favoured–Nation Treatment), Nov. 5, 2015, 
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Trans-Pacific-Partnership/Other-documents/Interpretation-of-In-
Like-Circumstances.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Q5Y-ZVQ4]; see also COMESA, supra note 10, art. 
17(2) (stating that when determining whether a claimant’s investment and domestic investments 
are “in like circumstances” a tribunal should regard circumstances including the effects of the 
investment on third persons, the local community and the environment; the relevant sector; the 
“aim of the measure” and “the regulatory process generally applied in relation to the measure”). 
 70 See TRADE LAW GUIDE (Oct. 15, 2017), http://www.tradelawguide.com/index.asp?toc=
content&id=88 [https://perma.cc/U66Y-S9K3] (source for the author’s analysis for finding the 
percentage of WTO decisions that dealt with Article XX GATT or Article XIV GATS that were 
fully or partially reversed on appeal). 
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There are many different ways of approaching the drafting of excep-
tions, and I will not address them in detail here. To begin, drafters need to 
have a clear idea of what they are trying to achieve. States could clarify that 
exceptions are to be understood as limiting the scope of investment obliga-
tions in the treaty and/or stipulate that the burden would rest with the claim-
ant to establish that the measure did not comply with the exception, if this is 
what is intended.71 States ought to consider the likely longevity of permissi-
ble objectives and whether they would keep pace with developments in, for 
example, technology.72 The required nexus between a measure and permis-
sible policy objectives is also an important consideration, as it effectively 
sets the desired level of protection of the objective (for example, an excep-
tion can require that a measure be “necessary” to achieve its objective, or a 
less strict nexus such as “related to”). The more lenient the nexus, the more 
it risks being circumvented by measures that are protectionist or otherwise 
hostile to foreign investors or investments. Language akin to the WTO gen-
eral exceptions’ chapeaux (which prohibit arbitrary, discriminatory or other 
application of measures that undermines the treaty’s objectives) is one way 
of addressing these concerns.73 An unresolved question is whether the in-
corporation by reference or the practice of transplanting WTO exceptions to 
investment treaties would enliven tribunals to follow WTO jurisprudence on 
these provisions.74 Although the Appellate Body has, over the years, inter-
preted the general exceptions in a way that is sensitive to governments’ reg-
                                                                                                                           
 71 The question of which disputing party has (or should have) the burden of proving that the 
exception applies is an important practical consideration, as the default position in international 
adjudication is that the party making an assertion must prove that assertion. See generally 
Henckels, supra note 15 (providing a more detailed discussion on the burden of proof in relation 
to exceptions). 
 72 See, e.g., 2015 Norway Model Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
art. 24(v), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/Download/TreatyFile/2873 [https://perma.cc/
2UFY-TH2P] (including the phrase “for the protection of the environment” in the general excep-
tions). This appears to be broader than “the conservation of exhaustible natural resources” in Arti-
cle XX(g) GATT. See GATT, supra note 13, art. XX(g). UNCTAD suggests exceptions should 
include the provision of “essential social services (e.g. health, education, water supply); the pre-
vention of tax evasion; the protection of . . . cultural heritage . . . cultural diversity; and media 
diversity.” World Investment Report 2015, supra note 14, at 140–41. 
 73 See, e.g., Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Slovk., art. 
IX(1), July 20, 2010 (prohibiting “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between investments or 
between investors, or a disguised restriction on international trade or investment”); Agreement for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Rom., art. XVII(3), May 8, 2009; Agreement 
for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Can.-Lat., art. XVII(3), May 5, 2009 (prohibiting 
“measures . . . applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimina-
tion”); ECT, supra note 33, art. 24(2) (prohibiting measures that constitute “a disguised restriction 
on Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, or arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
. . . [investors]”). 
 74 KURTZ, supra note 14, at 198–99. 
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ulatory autonomy, it has also (problematically in my view) consistently in-
terpreted these provisions as affirmative defenses and, as a result, generally 
quarantined examination of regulatory purpose to this context, rather than in 
the context of determining compliance with the relevant substantive obliga-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay argues that there are good reasons to view exceptions (in 
their various manifestations) as permissions that limit the scope of the in-
vestment protections in the relevant treaty, rather than as defenses that are 
invoked to justify what would otherwise be unlawful conduct. Viewed as 
permissions, exceptions signal to adjudicators and to potential claimants 
that states retain regulatory capacity in the areas covered by the provision 
and take regulatory purpose as central to the question of breach. The analy-
sis of decided cases involving exceptions in this Essay shows that invest-
ment adjudicators have not thoroughly considered this crucial issue. This is 
evidenced by their frequently terse and impressionistic reasoning regarding 
the purpose and effect of exceptions. 
Exceptions are one of a number of tools available to drafters. Given 
the stark lack of unanimity among tribunals concerning their analytic char-
acter and their relationship with the treaty’s investment protections, a con-
tinuation of current drafting approaches may, problematically, signal to tri-
bunals that the regulatory purpose of a challenged measure should be quar-
antined to the context of determining whether the exception applies once a 
prima facie breach of investment obligations has been established. This ap-
proach also creates the risk that tribunals will adopt a narrow interpretation 
of the exception or apply a stricter standard of review than it would other-
wise have applied in considering a state’s reasons for its actions. 
If we are to accept the orthodox view that the purpose of the invest-
ment regime is to engender sustainable economic development, it follows 
that investment protection should be viewed as a means to that end, to be 
balanced with governmental autonomy to pursue other welfare–enhancing 
objectives, such as protection of health and the environment. Viewing laws 
and other government actions taken to promote public welfare as exception-
al, rather than something that takes place in the ordinary course of govern-
ance, undermines this objective. Moreover, exceptions may not be the most 
effective way to shield bona fide public welfare measures from liability. It 
may be preferable to frame the substantive obligations in such a way as to 
provide greater clarity about the types of government action that are permit-
ted and proscribed. Still, at least as long as current institutional arrange-
ments for investor-state dispute settlement persist, exceptions may be an 
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important failsafe against erroneous interpretations of the substantive obli-
gations.  
Reading exceptions in their various forms across the body of invest-
ment treaties leaves one with the impression that the reasons for including 
particular exceptions and the form and coverage that these provisions take 
has not been well thought out. Rather than simply copy-pasting exceptions 
from previous investment and/or trade agreements, governments would do 
well to devote fuller consideration to the reasons why particular types or 
categories of measures ought to be shielded from liability under the regime, 
and the most fitting mechanism or mechanisms to achieve this purpose. 
